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Dewey and the Task before Us: The Making of the
Democratic Experience
1 This book review could also be entitled “John Dewey: Old and New,” recalling a distant
resemblance to one of the most well known books of Dewey, Individualism Old and New
(1930). But in this case the subject pursued under this title would be the development
in  the  reception  of  John  Dewey’s  work  in  the  past  century.  This  is  a  genuine
hermeneutical reflection on the significance of one of the most important American
intellectuals in the present day.
2 The following questions could belong to what in the European tradition of thought is
called  a  “hermeneutical”  approach.  In  which  context  is  Dewey’s  philosophy  to  be
understood? What could be the purpose of a collection of Richard Bernstein’s essays
from 1966 until 2010, i.e. from the old to the newest Bernstein’s Dewey? What can the
old Dewey say about the problems of democracy today? To answer the first question
requires  assuming  a  critical  position  towards  our  common philosophical  past.  The
second question assumes a critical impasse between the old and new Dewey, and also
the necessity to come back, in a reflexive way, to the origins from time to time. It
means trying to break the distance but,  at  the same time, having to assume that a
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certain tension between past and present problems can never entirely be loosened. The
hermeneutical question is thus bound to the practical interest of the common good. The
answer to the third question demands not only a critical relationship to our shared
past, but above all a compromise with the future: the task before us. And seeing the
democracy as the task before us is exactly the clue that allows identifying the master
key to Dewey’s thought, old and new: making of democratic experience. That is the
spirit, the ghost, that also crosses Bernstein’s interpretation of Dewey.
3 In  1966  Bernstein  shows  his  awareness  of  these  considerations  when he  chooses  a
fragment of Dewey’s essay “Philosophy and Civilization” (1927) as representative of
Dewey’s conception of philosophy: “The life of all thought is to effect a junction at some
point of the new and the old, of deep-sunk customs and unconscious dispositions, that
are brought to the light of attention by some conflict with newly emerging directions of
activity. Philosophies which emerge at distinctive periods define the large patterns of
continuity which are woven in effecting the enduring junctions of a stubborn past and
an insistent future” (44). The interaction between immediate experience and critical
distance, discretion and continuity, facts and values, the individual and the communal,
theory and praxis, thought and action, is revisited in the 12 chapters that constitute the
delicious introduction to Dewey’s thought in 1966.  The book is  completed with two
other essays first published in Bernstein’s other books: “John Dewey on Democracy: the
Task before Us” (from Philosophical Profiles. Essays in a Pragmatic Mode, 1986), and “John
Dewey’s  Vision of  Radical  Democracy” (from The Pragmatic  Turn,  2010).  The book is
attractive not only because it brings together all of Bernstein’s accounts of Dewey but
also  because  it  makes  them available  to  a  broad Spanish-speaking audience,  whose
access to the 1966 essays had been otherwise impossible, as Amazon and similar sales
had not existed until  a few years ago.  A third merit  of the book is obviously in its
presentation of the intellectual development of John Dewey, which would be especially
valuable to those who are not necessarily acquainted with one of the most classical
American pragmatists. But it is also a good opportunity for other Dewey scholars to
initiate  a  dialogue  concerning  the  importance  of  Dewey  for  the  tradition  of  the
American pragmatism in particular as well as the complex relation between philosophy
and democracy in general.
4 A fourth appeal of the book, which may not be as obvious as those mentioned before,
consists  in  the  mode  and  style  of  the  presentation.  Rather  than  chronologically,
Dewey’s philosophy is introduced via different topics. The book contains the obligatory
references  to  Dewey’s  life  without  being  excessively  biographical.  An  interesting
philosophical  discussion  takes  place  without  assuming  a  heavy  metaphysical
background. Bernstein’s keeps a modest tone, achieving a lightweight introduction to
such severe questions. The effect is seriously meritorious and the effect is a result of a
conscious and delicate treatment of Dewey’s deepest philosophical concerns. And this
is  of  course  the  most  Deweyan way to  attend his  conception of  philosophy,  which
requires a combination of “modesty and courage.” Attending to his conception is the
“only way I know of,” writes Dewey, “in which the philosopher can look his fellow man
in the face with frankness and with humanity.”1
5 Dewey’s philosophical themes were rich and various, reaching the variety of spheres of
human life, from psychology to the nature of scientific inquiry, from arts to values, and
from education to the ups and downs of political life. A short explanation of Dewey’s
main  contributions  to  philosophy  can  be  helpful  in  showing  the  complexity  of  his
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thought.  The  first  and  primary  concern  of  the  man  Dewey  could  be  the  vision  of
philosophy as a critical and reconstructive task. This is true if we decide to enter in a
reflexive dialogue with the past philosophical traditions which may nowadays sound
trivial, since making history of philosophy is part of doing philosophy. However, when
Dewey  started  doing  philosophy,  he  could  have  reflected  on  any  American
philosophical tradition. As Bernstein points out, the origins of Dewey’s philosophy are
an imprint of the conjunction between the philosophies of Hegel and Darwin. This is in
fact a double consideration of human reality as a dynamic reality, called either Geist or 
Nature. This is a world-view that contrasts strongly with the quiet realism or the sober
transcendental idealism. For realism, the objects stay as such, isolated and exposed to
our senses waiting to be discovered. For transcendental idealism, the Ding-an-sich may
remain  a  mystery,  but  we  can  keep  ourselves  satisfied  by  seeing  it  through  the
conceptual system projected by the categories of human understanding.
6 In some restricted sense, realism and transcendental idealism may admit surprises and
adventures. But this sense is far away from a world of relations and transactions, in
which the whole composition remains constantly changing. It forces one into a state of
permanent reconstruction of his experience, not because the discretional elements of
experience  wait  for  its  essence  to  be  perceived  or  revealed,  but  because  what  we
experience is a constantly changing reality. Experience itself is complex in how it is
part  of  a  structure  that  involves  a  whole  framework  beyond  the  instant  act  of
perception,  recalling experiences of  the past  and looking forward to the future.  As
Bernstein shows from the first chapters, the most exciting find of Dewey’s theoretical
philosophy is the discovery of another concept of experience, which is opposed to what
Dewey  called  “the  orthodox  description  of  the  experience”  (98).  The  unorthodox
description  of  the  experience  is  an  attempt  to  overcome  the  classical  dualisms  in
epistemology  (experience  vs.  reflection,  subjectivity  vs.  objectivity,  activity  vs.
passivity) that Dewey considers to be misleading. In this way, experience and nature
could  not  be  understood as  two opposing  realities  since  all  experience  takes  place
within  nature.  Nature  must  thus  be  redefined  as  a  “variety  of  transactions”  (119).
Reconsidering and reconstructing the complex unity of  experience allows Dewey to
state that “every reaction is adventure, risk,” for every living being compelled to give a
response to its environment (111). Following this argument it is easier to notice the
coherence  between  Dewey’s  theoretical  philosophy  and  his  philosophy  of  science.
Dewey  understands  scientific  inquiry  as  the  reconstruction  of  an  undetermined,
obscure, confused or problematic situation and, in addition, finding the solution. Every
situation is a preliminary stage for future problems whose specificity cannot be known
to ourselves in the present and depends on unimaginable situations arising from our
actual  perspective.  We  not  only  have  natural  history  but  nature  also  has  its  own
history.
7 Stressing  the  continuity  of  the  experience  within  nature  finds  its  counterpart  in
Dewey’s definition of values. Dewey takes the divorce between science and values as
one of the most dangerous illness of our times (152). The naturalist fallacy between
facts and values since Hume is causing more damages to our pursuit of a good life than
what we could suspect: moral life is also a subject of inquiry, of choosing the right ends,
of experimenting by using imagination with hypothetical possibilities of action, in an
analogous way as we do in the natural science. This is without a doubt one of the most
controversial points in Dewey’s philosophy. Bernstein places Dewey in the Aristotelian
tradition: values do not exist in an independent realm of pure ideas. They are relative
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to  the concrete  situation and depend on a  complex process  of  deliberation.  Values
ratified  by  deliberation  deserve  the  special  name  of  “consummatory  experiences”
(154). It could be interesting in this point to figure out a connection between Dewey’s
consummatory experiences and Dilthey’s Erlebnisse or Husserl’s Lebenswelt. They are all
a means to underline the continuity of experience between the spheres and times of
human life.
8 The moral philosophy of Dewey is summarized in a few traits. One could think that
Dewey’s formula for the dealing with practical conflicts is relatively easy: Reasoning +
Experience = Practical Intelligence. But that would be a false presumption. Becoming an
intelligent, experienced individual, means learning to make the correct decisions and
takes a lot of work. It requires training in basic habits and dispositions that have to be
embodied in our community. Our commitment is not fulfilled until we take the forging
of a certain form of life. Our personal task should consist in embracing the unique form
of  life  that  promotes  equally  common goods  and  individual  development.  Here  we
arrive  to  the  cornerstone  of  Dewey’s  philosophy:  the  school  as  the  labor  of  our
democracy. Dewey’s “pedagogic creed” converges with Dewey’s “democratic faith.”
9 What is striking of Bernstein’s reading of Dewey is how soft this step from theoretical
inquiry to practical reason seems to be. This is a very delicate step, showing the bridges
where Kantian philosophy makes a sharp division. But this is not affirmed in the sense
of a naive moral realism, but more in the spirit of “fallibilistic humanism” (236) that
Bernstein appreciates in Dewey. The continuity of the experience, whether in facts or
values, becomes a very important topic in Bernstein’s latest reflections. Perhaps is he
turning more and more to William James and the vision of an integral life in a Pluralistic
Universe? A pluralistic world, as James stated, is more a federal republic than an empire
or a kingdom. Bernstein revisits James in The Pragmatical  Turn in a radicalized way,
exploring the ethical consequences of his cosmological pluralism, which can no longer
be ignored. Or it might be true also the other way round in Dewey’s eyes: “Pragmatism
thus has a metaphysical implication. The doctrine of the value of consequences leads us
to take the future into consideration. And taking this into consideration of the future
takes us to the conception of a universe whose evolution is not finished, of a universe
which  is  still,  in  James’  term,  ‘in  the  making,’  ‘in  the  process  of  becoming,’  of  a
universe, up to a certain point still  plastic.”2 Being a “naturalistic humanist” means
that one abandons the belief that “nature is an indifferent, dead mechanism.”3
10 “A pluralistic universe is open to both tragedy and melioration,” writes Bernstein about
James. Dewey agrees with him in the chapter of Experience and Nature called “Existence
as Precarious and as Stable” noting that: ”Comedy is as genuine as tragedy.”4 We cannot
postulate  a  direct  or  univocal  relationship  between  theory  and  praxis  of  the
philosopher’s thought, but certainly we can identify theoretical tendencies that make
some  practical  virtues  more  “probable.”  The  detractors  of  pluralism  argue  that
pluralism is  a  philosophical  position claiming for respect  for  all  sorts  of  faiths and
beliefs  but  it  cannot  give  any  strong  theoretical  argument  to  support  its  own
compromise with the democratic credo. Maybe as pluralists we should always maintain
some sort of “bicameral disposition,” an unsolved tension between our compromise
with our personal existential faith and an opening to the existential compromises of
others.5 This  is  another  reason  to  see  democracy  as  a  task  before  us,  a  task  that
demands more radicalization, because according to Dewey: “The end of democracy is a
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radical end. For it is an end that has not been adequately realized in any country at any
time” (247).
11 This  pragmatist  and  pluralistic  approach  has  its  weaknesses,  of  course.  Bernstein
recognizes several big Achilles’ heels in Dewey’s pragmatism: the analysis of concrete
problems, the supplying of means to overcome the contradictions of democratic life,
and the institutional analysis, among others. Dewey also admitted that our pluralistic
world is something different to the pluralism he ascribes to Aristotle: “His plurals fall
however,  within  a  grammatical  system,  to  each  portion  of  which  a  corresponding
cosmic status is allotted. Thus his pluralism solved the problem of how to have your
cake and eat  it  too,  for  a  classified and hierarchically  ordered set  of  pluralities,  of
variants, has none of the sting of the miscellaneous and uncoordinated plurals of our
actual world.”6 But it would be in Dewey’s spirit to allow open paths for further inquiry
about how to improve our conditions of life. In the theory, some of his more important
contributions were to denounce the misleading images that held us captive, to speak in
a  Wittgensteinian  language:  the  epistemological  metaphor  of  the  spectator  which
advances what Bernstein will later call the “Cartesian anxiety.”7 The anxious search for
ultimate foundations returns to philosophy under a plurality of forms. And the best
strategy is not a confrontation with the enemy but a dialogical deconstruction of his
seductive  power  and  the  emphasis  of  points  for  possible  mutual  understanding.
Bernstein  does  this  in  two rounds.  In  1966  against  the  most  influent  philosophical
tendencies of the moment: phenomenology, philosophy of science, linguistic analysis
and existentialism. In 1986 he deals with the false dichotomy between liberalism and
communitarianism. In both cases the use of Dewey’s remedy has a healthy, comforting
effect.
12 Perhaps this effect explains partially why European philosophers care about American
pragmatism, besides being, as the American classical pragmatist has seen it, a further
development of philosophy with European roots.8 In some sense, being a Pragmatist is
like being an existentialist, assuming tragedy and improvement as human possibilities,
but it is certainly more “hygienic” that Sartre’s nausée and sees human commitment
not as a vain passion but as an enriching conquering of horizons.  It allows being an
individual  without  neglecting  the  civic  compromise  with  the  community.  This
community is not the abstract formal condition of Kantian categorical imperative. It is
concrete and present. It allows being critical but still trusting, in contrast to skepticism.
And requires a more critical use of divisions, names and labels, while stresses more
continuities  and  relationships,  transactions  and  constellations.  It  might  be  the
philosophy  that,  following  a  well-known  Hegelian  sentence,  captures  its  epoch  in
thoughts.
13 The introduction of Ramón del Castillo shows in a diaphanous way the advantages of
these hermeneutical and pragmatist approaches to philosophy. He can present briefly
what is at play between the conflicting narratives of contemporary American thought.
He offers what a good introduction should offer to the curious ones who are new to
Dewey: (1) a cultural and historical portrait of the rising, fall and rehabilitation of the
intellectual figure of John Dewey at the beginning of the 20th century, which in turn,
explains  (2)  what  made  Bernstein’s  approximation  to  Dewey  so  surprising  and
interesting by that time, (3) that his first dealing with Dewey can be proven for its
continuity and its revision in the brief two new translated essays, and (4) what role
Dewey  plays  in  Bernstein’s  philosophical  career  as  a  pragmatist  himself.  The
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translation of Alicia García Ruiz has a wonderful cadence that gently accompanies the
rhythm of the thoughts presented. Two recommended bibliographies include one from
Richard Bernstein in 1966 and another by Ramón del Castillo and Alicia García in 2010.
This  informs  the  reader  about  the  movements  and  the  gaps  within contemporary
Pragmatism in this time interval.
14 We began with the claim that there is a possible hermeneutic and practical account of
Dewey, which means nothing less than saying Dewey could help us to cope with the
present problems of democracy. Bernstein already has an answer: what we need for the
problems of democracy is more democracy. I  would like to end this presentation of
Dewey, with a reflection of Gadamer, a long-life friend of Richard Bernstein and the
Founding Father of the philosophical hermeneutics. He said, that all human experience is
part of  an endless conversation. A conversation, as Richard Bernstein sees,  is  in its
essence a thrilling human enterprise: “A conversation can be civilized, illuminating,
intelligent,  revealing, exciting. Truth may be relevant to a conversation, but so can
many other things, and a conversation is not to be thought of as a disguised inquiry
into truth or the discovery of foundations.”9 The tradition we belong to can also be seen
as a conversation with all the voices in both the past and the present, merging into a
complex polyphony. If we think of our traditions as conversations and our intellectuals
as  louder  voices  speaking  from  inside  the  community,  we  can  also  think  of  the
philosopher as one who is not dead when he speaks his last word, but when his or her
voice disappears of the conversation. And this is our decision and responsibility,  to
decide what to make in the future with Dewey, keeping in mind the old and the new.
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